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Antitrust Developments
By John C. Staton, Jr.* and Michael Eric Ross**
In broadest terms, the performance of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit' in the antitrust area ' during 1976 might best be characterized as
solid. Although demonstrating little of the innovative yet well-reasoned
analysis which distinguished several 1975 decisions, 3 none of this year's
antitrust opinions appear to be as susceptible to criticism as were, for
example, Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.' and Cooper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.5 Indeed, a substantial portion of the
"development" of the substantive law in 1976 consisted of the court's
attempts to "clarify" some of the implications of certain of its prior rulings.'
* Partner in the law firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. B.S., Georgia Institute of
Technology (1960); LL.B., Emory University (1963). Member of the Georgia Bar.
** Associate of the law firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. A.B., University of
Florida (1971); J.D., Harvard University (1974). Member of the Georgia Bar.
The opinions expressed are the personal views of the authors.
1. Since no member of the court authored more than two of its 1976 antitrust opinions,
and only Judges Dyer and Ainsworth sat on as many as five antitrust panels, it is particularly
appropriate to regard this year's effort as reflecting the collective wisdom of the court. In fact,
except Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977), no antitrust case decided in 1976 produced
multiple opinions.
2. This survey will be confined to developments in federal antitrust law. But last year's
decisions did include two related to state-law issues at least tangentially relevant to this
subject: Wilkinson v. Manpower, Inc., 531 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1976) (restrictive employment
covenant), and Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976) (under the common law of Florida, its Attorney
General is empowered to bring suit under the federal antitrust laws to recover damages
allegedly suffered by the state as a consumer).
3. E.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); St. Bernard General Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Serv.
Ass'n, 510 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1975).
4. 522 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1975), criticized in Ross, Territorialand Customer Restrictions
on DistributingAgents or Consignees: The Nature of "Title, Dominion, and Risk of Loss,"
13 GA. ST. B.J. 39 (1976).
5. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975), criticized in Izard, Staton & Ross, Of Bicycles and Beer:
Vertical Territorial and Customer Restraints from Schwinn to Coors, 26 MEn. L. Rzv. 507
(1975) (by implication); Note, Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., Should We Return
to a Rule of Reason?, 29 Sw. L.J. 629 (1975).
6. Four quasi-procedural occurrences of some interest should not go unnoticed. In what
is apparently a case of first impression (cf. Marine Firemen's Union v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 503 F.2d 246, 249-250 (9th Cir. 1974); Russ Togs, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 426 F.2d
850, 857 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970)), the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
tolling provision of Clayton Act §5(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §16(i) (Supp. 1976), extends for one year
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In at least one sense, however, 1976 can be seen as a continuation of the
preceding year. Again, plaintiffs did not fare very well; only a single trebledamage recovery survived appellate review.7
I.

STANDING

The nature of the standing requirement of §4 of the Clayton Act' continues to occupy a prominent place in the hierarchy of antitrust law issues
most frequently presented to the court for consideration. While the 1976
decisions that addressed this question generally appear to have reached the
"correct" results, the problems of standing have hardly been laid to rest.
A.

Interests Within the Protection of the Antitrust Laws

At bottom, the problem is essentially one of classification. Although in
1976 the court persisted in claiming that the Fifth Circuit is a "target area"
jurisdiction, it still provided sufficient evidence of the "direct injury" approach to support the judgment that this circuit has evolved its own
from the date of entry of a consent decree rather than from the expiration of the period for
appeal of the decree. Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 13611364 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
By contrast, the court's holding that antitrust claims are generally non-arbitrable, in Sam
Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976), simply followed
well-established precedent - for example, Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974),
and American Safety Equip. Co. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825-828 (2d Cir. 1968).
Third, the use of bifurcation in antitrust trials in the Fifth Circuit should be significantly
limited, if not effectively barred, by the combined weight of the dicta in Response of Carolina,
Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1323-1325 (5th Cir. 1976), and Carpa, Inc. v.
Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 52-54 (5th Cir. 1976).
Finally, Judge Gewin's opinion for the court in Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co.,
526 F.2d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1976), served clear notice to potential plaintiffs and district court
judges alike that the granting of summary judgments in antitrust cases, when justified, "will
contribute to the concept of efficient judicial administration."
7. See Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976). Even in this case,
however, a portion of the damage award was disallowed. On the other hand, judgments for
antitrust plaintiffs on the issue of liability were affirmed in both In re Yarn Processing Patent
Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1976), and Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida
Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1977). In no less than five other cases, lower court rulings favorable to antitrust defendants
were reversed and remanded. See Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,Inc., 540 F.2d
824 (5th Cir. 1976); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1976); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3651
(U.S. Mar. 28, 1977) (No. 76-864); Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976). See also
Reasoner & Carter, Antitrust Developments in the Fifth Circuit - October 1974 Term, 29
Sw. L.J. 801, 808 (1975).
8. 15 U.S.C.A. §15 (1973) states: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ...and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."
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"particular mixture" of the two formulations.' The "target area" concept
was first postulated in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,'5 and demands
that a plaintiff demonstrate that he is within the section of the economy
which is endangered by the alleged anticompetitive conduct." In other
words, to sue, the complainant must be one whom Congress intended to
protect when it proscribed the particular business behavior against which
the complaint is directed.'2 The "direct injury" requirement focuses on the
relationship between the alleged antitrust violator and the claimant. The
presence of an intermediate antitrust victim generally is sufficient to deny
standing.'3
Only slightly less prominent a source of future appellate litigation than
classification could be the court's "position" with respect to foreseeability
of injury as a necessary component of standing. In Yoder Bros., Inc. v.
California-FloridaPlant Corp.," the court said a presumption that one
intends the necessary consequences of his acts satisfies whatever purpose
and intention-and, by implication, foreseeability-requirements might
exist for standing under §4. On the other hand, in Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile
Towing Co., 1'the court held that an allegation that the plaintiff unions and
their members were the "intended victims" of the allegedly illegal conspiracy under consideration was sufficient to support the plaintiffs' standing
to sue."
Construing the standing requirement of Clayton Act §4, the court held
in Tugboat that four unions, their members and one of two tugboat companies competing in Mobile Bay could sue the local of a rival union and the
other tugboat company for allegedly conspiring to prevent the employees
of the defendant tugboat company from switching to plaintiff unions. By
9. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n. 7 (9th Cir.),
cert.denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), citing Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., -380 F.2d 484
(5th Cir. 1967). The Ninth Circuit did say, however, that the test of standing being applied
in the Fifth Circuit, at least as of 1973, most closely resembled the "target area" approach.
10. 221 F.2d 358, 362-363 (9th Cir. 1955).
11. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
12. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731-732 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). See also Comment, Standing Under Clayton §4: A Proverbial
Mystery, 77 DICK. L. REV. 73, 77 (1972).

13. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTrrUST ANALysis 160 at 74 (2d ed. 1974). The "direct
injury" approach stems from Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 707 (3d Cir. 1910).
14. 537 F.2d 1347, 1361 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1977).
15. 534 F.2d 1172, 1177 (5th Cir. 1976).
16. The court's explanations of the "target area" standard have also been phrased in
terms of identifying whether the affected section of the economy was one "against which the
[challenged] anti-competitive conduct was directed." E.g., Yoder Bros., 537 F.2d at 1360;
Tugboat, 534 F.2d at 1175; accord, e.g., Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir.
1967); International Rys. of Central America v. United Brands Co., 358 F. Supp. 1363, 1370
1373 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
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avoiding the need to pay higher wages, the defendant could drive the
plaintiff tugboat company out of business. The court said that the "mere"
loss of employment opportunity resulting from the plaintiff tugboat company's loss of business as a consequence of the defendant competitor's
allegedly illegal acts would not itself have given the plaintiff unions and
their members standing, a predictable conclusion in light of the court's
further observation that the distinction between independent contractors
and employees is irrelevant to the issue of standing. In Yoder Bros., the
Fifth Circuit held that two propagator-distributors of chrysanthemum cuttings had standing to bring an action against the dominant breeder of
chrysanthemums for participating in an unlawful concerted refusal to
deal.'7 Yet the court concluded in Southern Concrete Co. v. United States
Steel Corp.,' 8 that §4 did not contemplate a ready-mix concrete manufacturer which neither sold cement nor had ever purchased cement from defendant supplier suing said defendant for allegedly engaging in illegal
tying, exclusive dealing, and reciprocal dealing practices.
Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc.'" focused on the
"business or property" dimension of standing. An aspiring securities sales
representative alleged a loss of employment opportunity as a consequence
of an alleged conspiracy among brokerage firms not to hire any employee
terminated by any of their number. The court said the loss of employment
opportunity was an economic interest protectable under the treble-damage
provision of the Clayton Act. Chief Judge Brown's opinion for the court,
by quoting from and relying heavily on the expansive interpretation of
"business or property" contained in Nichols v. Spencer International
Press,2 adopted the very reasoning that was expressly rejected by Judge
Morgan's panel in Tugboat.2'
Several of the court's 1976 standing decisions reaffirmed the broader
range of persons and entities authorized to maintain actions for injunctive
relief under §16 of the Clayton Act.2
17. 537 F.2d at 1359-1361.
18. 535 F.2d 313, 316-318 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1977). Accord, Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F. Supp.-58, 76 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
19. 540 F.2d 824, 829-830 (5th Cir. 1976). See Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v.
Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934, 938 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1977), (alternative holding) (in a strict sense, the plaintiff association had no commercial
interests or enterprises). See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972)
("business or property" refers to "commercial interests or enterprises"). See generally Blackford, "Business or Property" Entitled to Protection Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 26

L. REv. 737 (1975).
20. 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
21. There was no need for Chief Judge Brown to "prove so much." Compare, e.g., Dailey
v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 486 (5th Cir. 1967) (the job of a commissioned
salesman is itself a §4 commercial venture or enterprise), with, e.g., Martin v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966).
22. Yoder Bros., 537 F.2d at 1361 n. 8 (dictum); Tugboat, 534 F.2d at 1174, 1178 n. 12;
Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d at 938 (dictum).
MER.
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Fact of Injury and Causation'

Unlike last year, it is not with respect to injury and causation as an
aspect of standing that the court made some of its more significant decisions during 1976.4
Nevertheless, the landscape is far from barren. For example, even ignoring the cases in which the court's handling of the "fact of damage" question seems singularly routine,2" much could be written regarding the opinions in which the court addressed the nature of the causal proof demanded
of plaintiffs seeking to recover damages for lost investments" or for alleged
injuries suffered as a result of defendants' alleged imposition of territiorial
2
restrictions.
23. Any attempt to categorize the components of a §4 cause of action, or to segregate a
series of decisions along such lines, necessarily reflects a degree of artificiality, since "[piroof
of. .. causation or fact of damage from the violation is often .. .closely intertwined with
the proof of the amount of . . .damages." Reasoner & Carter, supra note 7, at 817. See
Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1324 & nn.39-42 (5th Cir.
1976) (in context of the admissibility, during the liability stage of a bifurcated trial, of
evidence going to amount of damages). In this survey, at any rate, the effect of "offsetting
benefits" accruing to plaintiffs as a result of an antitrust violation is considered to be a part
of the damage assessment. See text at notes 130-140, infra.
24. In light of the weight of authority, the language of §4 and the arguable requirements
of the Constitution it is difficult to accord full respect to the dicta in Yoder Bros. which
distinguished "the standing inquiry [from] the substantive issues of causation and fact of
damage" and denied that "ultimate proof of injury in fact is a necessary requirement for
standing." 537 F.2d at 1360 nn. 5 & 6. But see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611,
4613 n.7 (U.S. June 9, 1977). Particularly disturbing is the fact that the case on which the
court purports to rely, In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 n. 11 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), held directly to the contrary. To the extent that the
Fifth Circuit continues to embrace sub silentio the "direct injury" approach to the
"protectable interests" aspects of Clayton §4, at least "proximate" causation will remain
within the "standing inquiry." See Tugboat, 534 F.2d at 1177; Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d at 937-938.
25. "In our view, 'impact,' 'fact of damage' and 'causal link' mean the same things."
Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1321 n.34 (5th Cir. 1976).
26. In Cinema-Tex Enterprises, Inc. v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., 535 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir.
1976), the court affirmed a directed verdict for defendant on the issue of fact of injury and
causation. In Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313, 318 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977), the court affirmed a partial
summary judgment for defendant on the issue of injury of fact. In Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
v. Instrumentation Lab., Inc., 527 F.2d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 1976), the court affirmed a directed
verdict for defendant on the issue of causation. Cf. Abercrombie v. Lums, Inc., 531 F.2d 775,
778-79 (5th Cir. 1976) (alternative holding) (affirms denial of plaintiffs' Clayton Act §16
motion for a preliminary injunction-causation).
27. See Carps, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 51-52 (5th Cir. 1976) (restaurant
folded two years after suit was filed).
28. See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1320-1323 (5th
Cir. 1976). In that case, no pre-damage period evidence of conduct was shown; extraterritorial solicitations and sales were made without reprisals and, in some instances, because
of "leads" provided by defendant; and the respective potentials of the assigned territories had
not been exhausted.
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It is the court's treatment of the "passing on" defense29 as recognized
by the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.," however, which holds the promise of notability. Judge Goldberg,
writing for the court in Yoder, first placed the issue in perspective by
observing that "the ultimate question of availability of the defense vel non
is a legal one for the court."'" Next, taking great pains to emphasize that
the problem under consideration was the "defensive" use of passing-on, 2
he outlined the court's basic attitude toward the defense: "[W]e believe
that a flexible, policy-oriented approach should be taken .... Particularly,
the overriding importance of the private treble damage action in the antitrust enforcement scheme should be kept in mind."
Not surprisingly, the defendant's practices did not survive this scrutiny.
Since the unlawful programs at bar did not predate the imposition of the
illegal overcharges," they lacked-one of the two essential characteristics of
the "cost plus contract" exceptions mentioned by the Supreme Court in
Hanover Shoe as possibly representative of a passing-on situation which
may pass antitrust muster.3 This deficiency also demonstrated the flaws
in the defendant's arguments that purported to meet directly the Hanover
Shoe policy considerations. 7 Consequently, not only was the trial judge
correct in denying the defendant's motions for a directed verdict or a
JNOV, but as a matter of law the defendant was not entitled to the
passing-on defense."
29. See generally Schaefer, Passing-OnTheory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 883 (1975); Beane, Antitrust: Standing
and Passing-On,26 BAYLOR L. Rav. 331 (1974).
30. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
31. 537 F.2d at 1374.
32. Id. at 1374 & n. 27. Until the Supreme Court's recent decision in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977), a different approach to the passing on defense
was required if the question were one of "plaintiff's access to a forum instead of defeating a
treble damage award" (dictum). See generally Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases:
The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 976 (1975); Note, The Effect of Hanover
Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-OnDoctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 98 (1972).
33. 537 F.2d at 1375 (citations omitted).
34. "Pre-existence" for purposes of the passing-on defense was read to require that the
buyer have a contract with a particular customer for a particular sale before the illegal
overcharge is imposed. See id. at 1376. But cf. Obron v. Union Camp Corp., 355 F. Supp.
902, 906 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973).
35. The other is that "the contractual arrangement must assure that whatever the cost
of the product was to the buyer, it is the same to the customer." 537 F.2d at 1376.
36. See 392 U.S. at 494. See generally Pollack, Automatic Treble Damages and the
Passing-OnDefense: the Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANerrRausT BuLL. 1183 (1968).
37. See 537 F.2d at 1375-1376, construing 392 U.S. at 492-494. Specifically, defendant
failed to introduce evidence sufficient to reduce to an acceptable level the uncertainties
surrounding the probable effect of a change in price either on total sales or on costs per unit
for a modified sales volume.
38. Still, because the jury might have relied on an improper "price differential theory"
of recovery, the court "reluctantly" reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the
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AcTi.inES

Aside from a footnote confrontation with the scope of the exemption
afforded to labor unions by §6 and §20 of the Clayton Act,39 the court this
year was able to confine its forays into the thicket of alleged antitrust
immunities to two cases questioning concurrent federal regulation and
three cases involving varying degrees of "state action." While the Supreme
0 arguably merges
Court's recent decision in Cantorv. Detroit Edison Co.O
the analytical considerations raised by concurrent federal regulation and
state action," there remain both practical" and jurisprudential" reasons
for viewing them separately.
A.

Inconsistent FederalRegulation

Given the Supreme Court's holdings last year in Gordon v. New York
Stock Exchange, Inc." and United States v. NationalAssociation of Securities Dealers, Inc.,"5 the Fifth -Circuit in Harding v. American Stock Exchange, Inc. 4 could hardly do anything other than affirm the dismissal of
a cause of action alleging that the defendant had violated §1 and §2 of the
Sherman Act by suspending the trading of, and then delisting, the stock
damage issue, relying on Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 695 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). Yoder Bros., 537 F,2d at 1372.
39. 15 U.S.C.A. §17 (1973); 29 U.S.C.A. §52 (1973). The defendant brokerage firms alleged to have illegally conspired to restrict the movement of the labor force in the industry
could not take advantage of the provisions "primarily designed to exempt conduct of labor
organizations." Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 829 n. 9 (5th
Cir. 1976). Accord, Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 607-608 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); cf.
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-886 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club., Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 496-500
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
40. __U.S-,
96 S. Ct. 3110, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1976).
41. "[Alssuming that there are situations in which the existence of state regulation
should give rise to an implied exemption, the standards for ascertaining the existence and
scope of such an exemption surely must be at least as severe as those applied to federal
regulatory legislation." Id. at 3120, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1153. See id. at 3123, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1157
(plurality opinion criticizing view that state action should confer immunity "no matter how
peripheral or casual the State's interests may be"). But see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 45
U.S.L.W. 4895, 4898 (U.S. June 27, 1977).
42. For an appreciation of the problems of interpreting Cantor see Walbolt, Antitrust
Liability for Business Actions Complying With State Law, 50 FLA. B.J. 551, 554 (1976), and
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAuv. L. Rsv. 56, 229-38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term].
43. Compare Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), with New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363,
371 & n.17 (9th Cir. 1974). See generally The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 42, at
234 n. 37; 53 TExAs L. Rxv. 566, 572-73 (1975).
44. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
45. 422 U.S. 694 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as NASD].
46. 527 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1976).
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of the company in which the plaintiff was a shareholder. In Gordon a
unanimous Court upheld the exchanges' longstanding practice of setting
the minimum rates of commission chargeable by their members for securities trading services since the SEC had diligently exercised its
discretionary authority under §19(b)(9) of the 1934 Act to supervise "the
fixing of reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing, and other
charges."'" The majority's opinion in NASD was even more deferential. It
conferred immunity on the defendants' alleged resale price maintenance
and concerted refusals to deal because of the rather vague delegation of
rule-making power to the Commission contained in §22(d) and §22(f) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940.8 Furthermore, because §12(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 expressly sanctions delisting only by application to the SEC and "upon such terms as the Commission may deem
necessary to impose for the protection of investors,"' 9 the Harding result
was predictable.
Also to have been anticipated was the summary judgment granted to the
defendants in Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc.50 The principal defendant, ACI,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of all CAB-certified airlines, was formed in 1947
to serve as the airlines' agent for handling air cargo. It arranged for the
necessary cargo-handling services to be provided at each airport served by
any of them within the United States. The plaintiff was the trustee-inbankruptcy for Air Transfer, Inc. (ATI), which from 1947 until late 1971
had the exclusive contract with ACI for all pick-up and delivery of air cargo
at Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta. In May, 1972, ACI terminated its relationship with ATI upon receiving a copy of ATI's bankruptcy
petition. ATI's financial position, already shaken, had deteriorated in 1972
after ACI awarded a second cargo-handling franchise to the co-defendant
trucker. The trustee in bankruptcy for ATI filed suit under §1 and §2 of
the Sherman Act shortly after ACI terminated its contract with ATI.
In light of the plaintiffs failure to allege that the substitution of truckers
was motivated by any independently anti-competitive purpose,5 such as
price-fixing or allocation of markets, it is questionable whether a §1 cause
of action could have been stated."2 Nonetheless, the defendants elected to
47. 15 U.S.C.A. §78s(b)(9) (1971). By Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (June 4, 1975), reference
to commission rates are now found in §6(e), 15 U.S.C.A. §78f(e) (Supp. 1977).
48. 15 U.S.C.A. §80a-22(d), §80a-22(f) (1971). See 422 U.S. at 728-735. See generally
Note, SEC Regulation as a Pervasive Regulatory Scheme-Implied Repeal of the Antitrust
Laws with Respect to National Securities Exchanges and the NASD, 44 FORD. L. REv. 355
(1975); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 202-211 (1975).
49. 15 U.S.C.A. §781(d) (1971). See also 17 C.F.R. §240.12d2-2(c) (1976).
50. 534 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1976).
51. Id. at 1129 & n. 11.
52. See, e.g., Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245, 1248-1249 (5th Cir. 1975);
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 79-80 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). See also Reasoner & Carter, supra note 7, at
812. Plaintiff's §2 allegations were better drafted. See 534 F.2d at 1129 n. 11.
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ground their motions solely on the exemption from the antitrust laws contained in §414 of the Federal Aviation Act: "Any person affected by any
order made under sections 1378, 1379, or 1382 of this title shall be, and is
hereby, relieved from the operations of the 'antitrust laws' . . . insofar as
may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order."" The court's application of this provision to the facts at bar was impressively thorough and cogently presented.
For purposes of this survey, however, the Scroggins opinion seems most
noteworthy for its enlightened interpretation of the Supreme Court's hold54
ing in Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
First, the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that Hughes requires
specific CAB approval of the particular allegedly unlawful behavior as a
condition of §414 immunity. To the contrary, it was deemed to be satisfactory "so long as the alleged conduct is clearly within the contemplation of
prior CAB orders." 5 Since the original CAB order sanctioning the organization of ACI had afforded it full power to negotiate with trucking companies for the pick-up and delivery of air cargo, this part of the Hughes test
was adjudged to have been met.
Second, the court determined that the CAB authorization was necessary, but not sufficient, to bring the defendants' actions within the exemption. In addition, the CAB must be shown to have exercised continuous
supervisory jurisdiction over the affected area of operations. This condition
too was determined to have been satisfied by the CAB's practice of scrutinizing every amendment to every previously approved contract between
ACI and a local trucker with a view toward protecting the public against
possible anticompetitive effects.
It appears, consequently, that the "developments" in the Fifth Circuit
in this arena of non-actionable activities during 1976 might be viewed as
the court's implementation of the law as manifested in several recent Supreme Court decisions.
B.

State Action

Somewhat questionable was the court's handling of the "so-called stateaction exemption"" in the three reported cases which raised the issue. Of
the court's two "state action" decisions handed down before the Supreme
53. 49 U.S.C.A. §1384 (1976).
54. 309 U.S. 363 (1973). See generally Pogue, Exclusive Jurisdiction, 43 ANTTRUST L.J.
313, 320-21 (1974).
55. 534 F.2d at 1131. Compare the text at note 65, infra.
56. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975). The debate over whether
"exemption" properly describes the protection sought by private parties will not be treated
here. Compare, however, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3121, 49 L. Ed. 2d
1141, 1155 (1976) (plurality opinion) with Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v.
Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1, 8-9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Handler].
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Court decided Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 57 only City of Lafayette v.

Louisiana Power & Light Co.58 merits textual discussion. 9
The sole question in Lafayette was "whether the actions of a city are
automatically outside the scope of the antitrust laws." 0 The utility had
filed a counterclaim against the cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, alleging violations of §1 and §2 of the Sherman Act and of §3 of the
Clayton Act. In light of Parker v. Brown,' the lower court dismissed the
counterclaim in its entirety. After the judgment of the trial court, however,
the Supreme Court decided Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. 2 Having the
benefit of this decision, the court of appeals did not hesitate in reversing
the order of dismissal and remanding the case for further consideration.
After summarily rejecting both the cities' contention that they should
be equated with states for purposes of determining "state action, 6' 3 and
the utility's "invitation to import the discredited proprietarygovernmental distinction into this area of the law,"" the court turned to
the task of framing the inquiry to be undertaken by the trial judge upon
remand:
A subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt from the
operation of the antitrust laws. Rather, a district court must ask whether
57. 96 S. Ct. 3110, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1976).
58. 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3651 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1977) (No.
76-864).
59. The court quickly disposed of defendants' state-action argument in Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976), on the ground that the challenged behavior had not been
"require[d]" by the state. See id. at 396 & n. 5. Compare note 73, infra, and accompanying
text with text at notes 80, 81, infra.
60. 532 F.2d at 432.
61. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See generally Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust:
Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975); Note, Parker v. Brown: A
Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164 (1975).
62. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
63. 532 F.2d at 434 n. 6; accord, Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (3d Cir.
1975) (municipal corporations). But see Litton Sys., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539
F.2d 418, 422 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1976) (dictum) ("Itihe 'immunity' is actually the nonapplicability of the Sherman Act .. . where the defendant is a state or division of a state."); New
Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363, 370 n. 15 (9th Cir. 1974) (by implication);
Handler, supra note 56, at 8. On the wisdom of interpreting the antitrust statutes with an
eye toward the Eleventh Amendment, see Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust
Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 89 HA~v. L. Rzv. 715, 727 n. 68
(1976); toward the Fourteenth Amendment, compare Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S.Ct.
at 3118 n. 31, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 1151 n. 31 with id.at 3133 n. 10, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1169 n. 10
(dissenting opinion).
64. 532 F.2d at 434 n. 8. Accord, New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363,
371-372 (9th Cir. 1974). But see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-791 (1975)
(the threshold inquiry focuses on whether the activity under attack is required by the state
"acting as sovereign"); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 936-937 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 709-712 (1974).
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the state legislature contemplated a certain type of anticompetitive
restraint.In our opinion, though, it is not necessary to point to an express
statutory mandate for each act which is alleged to violate the antitrust
laws. It will suffice if the challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent.u
The practical problems raised by this holding in the many states which
do not publish legislative history are highlighted by the court's characterizing as "capricious" the suggestion that a court confine its scrutiny to the
pertinent statutes themselves." Judge Tjoflat, writing for the court, did
concede, however, that "the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area [could itself indicate] that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of." 7
In Cantor, the Supreme Court took the position that "public utility
regulation typically assumes that the private firm is a natural monopoly
and that public controls are necessary to protect the consumer from exploitation."" The dissent, however, interpreted the majority opinion as confining the state-action exemption within "the boundaries of 'natural monopoly' power." 69
The Fifth Circuit in Lafayette seemed to accept this prospect by the
manner in which it purported to harmonize its holding with that of Saenz
v. University Interscholastic League:0 "It can scarcely be doubted that
[the setting of slide rule specifications were] within the contemplated
scope of the powers conferred upon the state university system (of which
the agency was a part) by the Texas legislature."'" Nevertheless, the court
said in Lafayette that each case ultimately will have to be decided on its
own specific facts.
Conditioning the availability of the state-action exemption on the legislature's clearly evidencing its intention to replace the federal antitrust laws
with an alternative regulatory system is difficult to fault.72 Affirmatively
commendable, moreover, is the court's apparent willingness to extend the
65. 532 F.2d at 434 (emphasis added).
66. 532 F.2d at 435 n. 9. But cf. 96 S. Ct. at 3114, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1146 (absence of explicit
statutory reference to the allegedly illegally regulated market taken as evidence of the state's
neutrality).
67. 532 F.2d at 434.
68. 96 S. Ct. at 3119, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1152.
69. Id. at 3136, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1173.
70. 487 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1973).
71. 532 F.2d at 435 (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286,
1302-1303 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v.
Paddick Pool Bldrs., Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). See
generally Note, Of Raisins and Mushrooms: Applying the Parker Antitrust Exemption, 58 VA.
L. REV. 1511, 1520-1524 (1972). This "clear statement" requirement also seems to have informed the Cantor decision. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 42, at 235. See
also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 45 U.S.L.W. 4895, 4898 (U.S. June 27, 1977).
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imprimatur of "state action" to conduct obviously encouraged and approved by the state, yet not literally "compelled." 73 Accordingly, the principal score on which Lafayette appears to be vulnerable is its failure to
include among the prerequisites for state-action immunity some sort of
proof that the legislature regularly satisfied itself that, with respect to the
activities in question, the defendant state agency was not exceeding its
delegated authority.7"
By contrast, Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co."
should be rationalized as simply the expected strugglings of the first court
of appeals to venture into the choppy waters left in the wake of Cantor.
The state-action issue was placed before the court in the context of a
dispute over the doctrine of primary jurisdiction." Responding to the
plaintiffs allegations that it had used tying and predatory pricing to restrict competition in the manufacture and distribution of private branch
exchange (PBX) telephone equipment, the defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint or to stay the proceedings pending reference to the regulatory commissions in Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, Arkansas and Texas.
The defendant said that the alleged illegal practices were embodied in
tariffs filed with and approved by these state agencies and thus constituted
state action not subject to the antitrust laws. The district court denied as
premature the motion to dismiss, but read Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange77 to authorize the granting of Bell's motion to stay the proceedings. Litton appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. Since
the court expressly reserved ruling on the merits of the appellee's state73. See 532 F.2d at 434 nn. 7-8. Compare Handler, supra note 56, at 13 ("the test must
be whether the conduct attacked as a violation of the federal antitrust laws is sanctioned by
state law, whatever form the sanction may take"), with Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against
Government-InspiredBoycotts, Shortages, and Squeezes: Wandering on the Road to Mecca,
61 CORNELL L. REv. 911, 916-927 (1976) (distinguishing the immunizing effects of sovereign
commands, approval, informal encouragement, and delegation of power to restrain).
74. Such a condition of close and continuous supervision is well-supported. See, e.g.,
Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1017-1018 (3d Cir. 1971); Gas
Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1062 (1972). But see Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248,
252 (4th Cir. 1971). See generally Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive
State Regulation, 39 ANTrrRUST L.J. 950, 964 (1970). In Cantor the Court appears to have
subsumed the "compulsion" and "active regulation" criteria within a newly mandated
"degree of state participation" assessment. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 45 U.S.L.W.
4895, 4898 (U.S. June 27, 1977).
75. 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1976).
76. See generally Jaffe, Primary JurisdictionReconsidered-The Antitrust Laws, 102 U.
PA. L. REV. 577 (1954); Kestenbaum, PrimaryJurisdictionto Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction:
A PracticalApproach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEO. L.J. 812 (1967).
77. 409 U.S. 289 (1973). See generally King, The "Arguably Lawful" Test of Primary
Jurisdiction in Antitrust Litigation Involving Regulated Industries, 40 TENN. L. REv. 617
(1973); Note, PrimaryJurisdictionin Antitrust Cases: Three Recent Decisions, 42 U.CIN. L.
Rzv. 725, 730-734 (1973).
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action defense, as a technical matter its extensive analysis of Cantor is
arguably dictum. Nonetheless, the practical import of the reasoning cannot be ignored.
At the heart of the court's opinion was the fact that in Cantoritself "no
suggestion was made by the Court that prior reference to the Michigan
Public Service Commission would serve any desirable purpose.""8 To infer
precedential significance from this occurrence, however, Judge Wisdom,
writing for the court, attempted to explain it in terms of general substantive legal principles.
First he drew from Cantor the "two possible reasons for exempting private conduct from the Sherman Act,"' , and then he measured the facts
before the court against these standards. To elaborate on this appraisal,
Judge Wisdom fairly characterized Cantor's dual concerns over imposing
antitrust liability as "unfairness to the private party if such [private]
conduct is required by a state and the supposed intention of the Sherman
Act itself not to apply to inconsistently regulated areas of the economy." s
Review of the record in Cantor, nevertheless, apparently persuaded the
court that immunizing "unfairness" contemplates only the situation where
the challenged practice was "coerced" by the regulatory agency.
Focusing then on the "federalism" consideration which must underlie
any theory of a state-action exemption,"' Judge Wisdom seemed to erect a
presumption to the effect that state public service commissions are captives of the utilities they are charged with regulating."2 At any rate, the fact
that Bell's tariffs appeared to have been "routinely acquiesced in by each
regulatory board" convinced the court that the activities at bar were not
"the product of any coherent state policy."'"
Under these circumstances, therefore, prior referencce to the state agencies was viewed as "seriously impair[ing] the ability of the district court
to enforce federal antitrust policy without providing sufficient countervailing benefits."" On the other hand, not only did the court affirm Bell's right
78. 539 F.2d at 423. "[lIn view of the importance the Supreme Court placed on the
[primary jurisdiction] doctrine in Ricci, it is to be expected that the Court would have
applied it again in Cantor had it been applicable." Id. n. 14.
79. Id. at 424.
80. Id. But cf. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 42, at 234: "The Court's
language and the form of its argument-in which it assumed without deciding the merits of
issues whose relative significance was left unstated-makes it very difficult to ascertain how
the majority would determine the presence or absence of a state action exemption in what it
deemed a harder case." See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 45 U.S.L.W. 4895, 4898 (U.S.
June 27, 1977).
81. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual
Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1972).
82. See 539 F.2d at 423-424 & n. 12.
83. Id. at 423.
84. Id. at 424. See also note 74, supra, and accompanying text.
85. 539 F.2d at 424.
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to attempt to demonstrate the "regulatory necessity" for its practices, but
implied that the eventual order of the district court should not be made
final without affording the state commissions an opportunity "to suggest
reasons why the tying of PBX equipment to general telephone service may
be necessary to the regulation of that service.""6 The deference to be accorded such "expertise," however, was rather conspicuously left undefined."
Im.

RESTRAINTS OF TRADE

The Fifth Circuit in 1976 made contributions to the development of the
law regarding Sherman Act §1 illegality of price-fixing, concerted refusals
to deal, vertically imposed market allocations and certain "business torts."
But, it is in the area of tying doctrine that the year's antitrust decisions
probably will be remembered. Taken together, the court's opinions in
Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc."9 and Response of Carolina,Inc. v. Leasco
Response, Inc. 0 signal that franchising arrangements9 ' in the Fifth Circuit
will receive a detailed judicial examination rather than being subjected to
summary review. In Carpa, nevertheless, the court affirmed virtually all
of a treble-damage judgment against the defendant franchisor.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Carpa litigation was the relatively lilliputian status of the franchisor. The Zuider Zee seafood restaurants were clearly little fish in an ever-widening pond. In fact, when the
plaintiffs entered the negotiations which culminated in their acquiring two
86. Id. See id. n. 15.
87. See generally The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 42, at 235-238 & n. 54.
Compare Note, supra note 61, at 1173-1176, with Handler, supra note 56, at 14-16.
88. This year's antitrust docket included but one case in which the court had to extend
its gaze beyond §1 of the Sherman Act and §3 of the Clayton Act: Yoder Bros., Inc. v.
California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1366-1369 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977). The court of appeals affirmed a directed verdict in favor
of the defendant on monopolization and attempted monopolization claims after agreeing with
the trial court that the relevant product market was "all ornamental plants" rather than
"chrysanthemums" or some sub-market. Cf. In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation,
541 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1976) (the record contains insufficient evidence to establish
conclusively the relevant product market). Moreover, it is primarily Chief Judge Brown's
partial dissent - saying that "[alt any given moment" the demand for chrysanthemums
might be such as to constitute a relevant product sub-market - which excites Yoder Bros.'
§2 discussion. See 537 F.2d at 1386.
89. 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976).
90. 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
91. The spectrum of business relationships encompassed by the generic term
"franchising," and the all too frequent failure of antitrust courts to appreciate these distinctions, has been the subject of much academic literature. See generally Chadwell & Rhodes,
Antitrust Aspects of Dealer Licensing and Franchising, 62 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 1, 3-4 (1967);
McCarthy, Trademark Franchisingand Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CALF. L.
REv. 1085, 1086-1087 (1970).
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outlets, only four Zuider Zee franchises were outstanding."
This circumstance provided the basis for the franchisor's contention that
the Zuider Zee trademark lacked the "coercive attractiveness" necessary
to bring the alleged tie-ins at bar within the per se proscription of §1 of
the Sherman Act. 3 In an important and entirely justified retreat from the
disquieting implications of its opinion in WarrinerHermetics,Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp.," the court agreed that "the mere existence of a
trademark in and of itself [does not] suppl[y] economic power sufficient
to constitute an antitrust violation."' 5 More specifically, it held that "the
existence or absence of economic power in a trademark ... [is a] question
of fact. In the absence of evidence about which reasonable men could not
differ, [it is an] issue for the jury.""
The franchisor's success was short-lived. Judge Coleman, writing for the
court, still found in the record ample evidence to support the jury's affirmative answer to the interrogatory asking whether the Zuider Zee mark
possessed "sufficient economic power appreciably to restrain competition
in the tied product market." Although most of the "proof" cited was the
kind usually relied on in tying cases, 7 the probative significance attributed
by the court to the "puffing" contained in the franchisor's promotional
literature" seems both unprecedented and of dubious merit."
92. Cf. Aamco Automatic Transmission, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 437 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (over 500 franchises coast-to-coast). Zuider Zee also had four restaurants of its own in
operation.
93. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court set forth the gist
of contemporary tying theory: "[Tie-ins] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a
party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain
free competition in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount of
interstate commerce is affected." Id. at 6. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969). Interestingly, the separability of the Zuider Zee mark from
the allegedly tied items appears to have been conceded by all concerned. See 536 F.2d at 45;
cf. note 100, infra. See generally Ross, The Single ProductIssue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Approach, 23 EMORY L.J. 963, 994-1000 (1974).
94. 463 F.2d 1002, 1015 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972), criticized in
Note, Antitrust Law- Tie-Ins- Chicken Delight 'Per Se' Doctrine Extended to Distributorship Franchise,4 SErON HALL L. REv. 610 (1973).
95. 536 F.2d at 48. Accord, e.g., Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1976-2 TRADE CAS. 61,202
at 70,478-70,479 (E.D. N.Y. 1976); Q-T Mkts., Inc. v. Fleming Cos., 394 F. Supp. 1102, 1109
(D. Colo. 1975).
96. 536 F.2d at 49. See generally Note, Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.: What's In a
Name?, 23 HAST. L.J. 1147 (1972).
97. The franchisees had sought out defendant-franchisor in order to benefit from the
goodwill and success signified by the Zuider Zee mark, and they paid defendant-franchisor
substantially higher prices for the "tied" products than prevailed in the market. See generally
Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HA~v. L. REv. 50,
55-58 (1958).
98. See 536 F.2d at 48 ("[mlost telling of all").
99. Cf.,e.g., C.A.R. Leasing, Inc. v. First Lease, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 306, 308 (N.D. Ill.
1975), in which the court held that defendant's forecast of its future market share was too
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Similarly susceptible to critical appraisal is Judge Coleman's treatment
of one of the several allegedly exculpatory "business justifications" raised
by appellants.1 0 In particular, after rightly rejecting attempts to invoke
either the "package rule" of Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King International,
Inc. 101
or the "protection of goodwill" defense often raised by alleged trademark tyers,' °2 the court disposed of the proferred "new industry" justification'03 with the comment that it was "indistinguishable" from the "quality
control" argument.1'0 Considering Judge Coleman's apparent willingness
to overlook the possibility that the antitrust laws might afford greater
leeway to a new "industry" than to a recent "entrant" into an established
commercial market, 05 such insensitivity to a new entrant's special qualitycontrol problems is even more puzzling.10
self-serving to be given controlling weight. But cf. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp.
258, 290-291 (N.D. Okla. 1973), modified on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (IBM's internal documents represent "significant" evidence
of its market shares). See also Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 850 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) ("Ithe fact that Bubble Up and the Coca Cola Company
sought franchise agreements with the same group of independent bottlers does not limit the
relevant market to those bottlers").
100. That the court placed the burden of proving such a defense upon defendantappellant revealed considerable progress, at least analytically, from its earlier reference to
the "single product defense" in Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1976) (dictum).
Indeed, that the court was willing to hear the franchisor in his own defense at all apparently
should not go unpraised. In dictum in Miller, the court said, "[Oince a tying arrangement
is found to exist in context of sufficient economic power, its illegality is established without
further inquiry into business excuses for its use." Id. (emphasis added).
101. 348 F. Supp. 799, 806-807 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The Carpacase involved not an isolated
sale, but a practice of offering "complete franchises." Accord, Northern v. McGraw-Edison
Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1345-1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1977).
102. One of defendant-franchisor's principals "admitted that the purchase provisions
were not intended for quality control, and that most of the items were readily subject to
specification." 536 F.2d at 47. See generally Comment, Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity of the Product" Defense, 62 MICH. L. Rzv. 1413 (1964).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 330 (1962) (dictum).
104. 536 F.2d at 47.
105. Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967) (dictum)
("newcomer"), and White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 369 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (a manufacturer "starting out in business or marketing a new and risky
product"), with Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 104 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3714 (U.S. June 14, 1976) ("necessary to the initial success or failure of an industry
with an uncertain and developing technology"), and United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (inchoate industry). See also Ammerman v.
Bestline Prods., Inc. 352 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (E.D. Wis. 1973) ("newness" does not provide
an automatic exemption from the antitrust laws).
106. See generally Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises,
Territorials, Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REv. 457 (1966).
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In Response of Carolina, the alleged tie-in was of computer hardware to
time-sharing services franchises. Unlike their counterparts in Carpa,however, these plaintiffs were obliged to prosecute their tying claims without
the evidentiary advantage supplied by a contractual restriction., 7 It was
their inability to overcome this initial obstacle-to prove that they were
"coerced into purchasing an unwanted product"'18 -that convinced the
court that the trial judge had not erred in directing a verdict in favor of
the defendant.'
The Fifth Circuit is squarely within the jurisprudential mainstream on
the issue of coercion as a necessary condition of per se unlawful tying;" 0
with Response of Carolinathe court closed ranks with those few perceptive
jurisdictions which have recognized "restraint of competition in the tied
product market" to be an equally indispensable prerequisite.," Lastly, and
conceivably of most consequence, the court seemed fully prepared to deny
the suggestion occasionally made"' that the "less restrictive alternative"
required by the "rule of reason""' includes the mandatory licensing of
107. See, e.g., Hi-Co Enterprises, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 1976-2 TRADE CAs. 61,053 at
69,756 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Amco Transmission, Inc. v. Taylor, 407 F. Supp. 430, 437-438 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
108. 537 F.2d at 1327.
109. See id. at 1328-1330. The court's perception of legitimate "persuasion" was remarkably "lenient," especially when contrasted with its contemporaneous admonition that the "use
of friendly persuasion instead of a club does not lessen the coercive aspects of the
[challenged] program itself." Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d
1347, 1365 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 ( U.S. Feb. 22, 1977). But cf.
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Mut. Theatres, Inc., 446
F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972) ("mere" bargaining ploy).
110. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1218 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1976); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten
Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1974). A recent commentary explained: "The term 'coercion'
may perhaps be best understood here not as a description of the subjective experience of the
bargaining process but as a measure of a court's confidence that the evidence before it does
indeed establish that a defendant connected the sale of two products - in purchasing the
tied product the plaintiff acted so automatically it was [as] if he were coerced."
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HLv. L. REv. 1318, 1509 n. 278 (1976). See Hill
v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976).
111. Compare 537 F.2d at 1330 n. 50 (alternative holding), with Coniglio v. Highwood
Serv., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Grossman
Devel. Co. v. Detroit Lions, Inc., 1973-2 TRADE CAs. 74,790 at 95,539 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd
without opinion, 503 F.2d 1404 (6th Cir. 1974).
112. See Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,441 at 20,347-48 (F.T.C. 1973). Cf. Tastee-Freeze Int'l, Inc., f1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,076 (F.T.C. 1972) (by implication). See also Remarks of James
T. Halverson, International Franchise Ass'n Symposium, May 6, 1975, in OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT, GROWING WITH ANTITRUST: PRACTICAL ADVICE ON ADAPTING SUCCESSFULLY TO ANTITRUST

LIMrrATION ON FRANCHISING, AND LICENSED DIsTmITInoN 24, 28 n.
as PRACTICAL ADVICE].

26 (1975) [hereinafter cited

113. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); American
Motor Inns. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1246-1249 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Day,
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trade secrets or know-how."' All things considered, therefore, the tying
analysis in Response of Carolinajust may be the high point of the court's
performance in the antitrust area during 1976.
In In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation,"5 the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the landmark case on vertically imposed market allocations,
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., "I and held that machinery manufacturing licensees may be prohibited by their patentee-licensor from selling the patented machinery to particular classes of customers." 7 The more
important construction of Schwinn, however, came in Response of
Carolina. After an exceptionally well-written and trenchant review of the
existing authorities, the court concluded that the "firm and resolute" language in Schwinn"' pertained solely to affirming Sherman Act §1
"jurisdiction""' and thus had no relevance if an unambiguous territorial
or customer "restriction" or "limitation" is contractually created.' 0 With
respect to the proper characterization of the contractual provision in
Response of Carolina,the court first noted that such questions of "degree"
are usually for the trier of fact to judge.'' Moreover, in light of the disparity
between the 15% royalty on inside area sales and the 70% royalty on extraterritorial sales, especially in combination with an overlaying system of
areas of primary responsibility and evidence of the defendant's intention
to discourage outside sales, the jury could reasonably have inferred that
territorial "restrictions" had been imposed by the defendant. The district
court's directed verdict in favor of the defendant on this cause of action
was not reversed, however, because of the plaintiff's inability to demonstrate the requisite "fact of damage."
Yarn Processingraised the issue of price-fixing, but the court refused to
label as per se unlawful a profit-sharing arrangement lacking a predetermined division of actual profits.'1 It expressed no such reluctance, however, with respect to an industry-wide system of maintaining uniform royExclusive Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal,29 OHIO ST. L.J. 539, 567 n. 124
(1968) (rule of reason remains the pervasive antitrust standard).
114. See 537 F.2d at 1330-31 & n. 52 (dictum); accord, Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,
448 F.2d 43, 51 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1971) (dictum), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). See also
Remarks of Daniel Levitt in PRAcTicAL AnvicE supra note 112, at 81.
115. 541 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1976).
116. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In its major antitrust decision of the 1976 term, the Supreme
Court overruled the per se rule it had announced in Schwinn. See Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 4828 (U.S. June 23, 1977).
117. Cf. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938).
118. 388 U.S. at 372.
119. 537 F.2d at 1314-1315.
120. See id. at 1318-1319 & n. 25. See generally Izard, Staton & Ross, supra note 5, at
512-514.
121. See 537 F.2d at 1319 n. 28.
122. 541 F.2d at 1135. Cf. Citizens Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969);
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 328 (1904).
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alties through the cross-licensing of patents.' Reviewing three cases of
concerted refusals to deal, the court ruled that an alleged "no-switching"
agreement among employers is a legally cognizable premise for a cause of
action under the Sherman Act;'24 that a combination ambng chrysanthemum breeders to sell cuttings only to propagator-distributors who signed
a standardized contract containing customer and end-use restrictions and
a fixed royalty amount'23 could no more be justified than were the practices
condemned in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC;' 8 and
that a district court's summary judgment for defendants was correct, since
the plaintiff had not carried its burden of producing "significant probative
evidence at least of the existence of the -alleged agreement or conspir27
acy."
Finally, in a case raising the issue of "business torts,' 21 8 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a trial judge's denial on the merits of the plaintiff's motion for a
permanent injunction against the defendants' alleged "pirating" of the
plaintiff's key employees, "trade libel," and misappropriation of the plaintiff's confidential information. The Fifth Circuit expressed no opinion,
however, on the extent to which-if at all-it adopts the reasoning of
2
Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. PioneerDistributing Co.' 1
IV.

DAMAGES

It goes without saying that the assessment of recoverable damages is one
of the most difficult phases of antitrust litigation."" This comment will
deal with the court's confrontation this year with the "paradox" of a dam3
age assessment producing no net recovery. '
Only last year the court stated that "by-products of a restriction inuring
123.

541 F.2d at 1135-1137. Cf. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 379

(1952); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 314 (1948). But cf. Wetzel, Did Line
Material Really Rule Out Patent Price Fixing? 26 MER. L. REv. 471 (1975).
124. Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 828-829 (5th Cir.
1976).
125. Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1364-1365 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).

126. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
127. Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 393-396 (5th Cir. 1976)
(emphasis in original).
128. Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1976).
129. 353 F.2d 618, 621-622 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966). See 534 F.2d
at 643. See generally Boone, Single-CorporationCompetitive Torts and the Sherman Act: A
Projection Based Upon a Review of the Albert Pick, Atlantic Heel, and Perryton Cases, 2 GA.
L. REv. 372 (1968); Note, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 909 (1974).
130. See generally Parker, Measuring of Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17
ANTITRUST BULL. 497 (1972); Comment, Monetary Recovery Under Federal Antitrust
Statutes, 45 TExAs L. REv. 856 (1967).
131. See Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1127,
1136-38 (1976).
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to a plaintiff's benefit can be considered in computing damages."'," Accordingly, somewhat unforeseen was the court's refusal in Carpa to allow
defendant-franchisor to offset any accrued trademark royalties against
plaintiff-franchisee's recoverable damages.' 33
The court's attempt to rationalize its holding raises a number of ques3
tions. First, it "distinguished" Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. 1 on the
ground that "a portion of the overcharges claimed as damages [in that
case] was actually a royalty and should not have been included as a part
of the damage computation."'' 5 One is hard-pressed to fathom, however,
why the form in which a legitimate royalty is collected should affect the
38
substantive question of whether it might be used to reduce liability.
Alternatively, Judge Coleman reasoned:
In cases similar to the one before us, patent holders have repeatedly been
denied royalties and infringement protection when the patent was employed to commit an antitrust violation.
132. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968) (dictum) ("[tihe possible beneficial byproducts of a restriction ...
can of course be taken into consideration in computing damages").
133. 536 F.2d at 50. The court also rejected the theory of offsetting benefits in two other
contexts. Compare id. at 46, 51 (neither a defense to illegal tying nor a mitigator of resulting
damages that franchisee could have "gotten out" at any time), with Areeda, supra note 131,
at 1138 ("[Unless the benefit [of the tying product] equaled or exceeded the increment
[in price of the tied product], a rational person . . .would not have entered into the
arrangement at all").
134. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
135. 536 F.2d at 50. In Siegel the franchisor had not charged any franchise fee but had
charged a premium on the tied items. The court of appeals decided that plaintiff's damages
from such "overcharges" should be offset by a reasonable franchise fee and remanded the case
for a new trial on that issue-without ruling on the details of the calculation. See 448 F.2d
at 52-53. By contrast, a Zuider Zee operator in Carpa paid a $12,500 franchise fee and a
royalty of 1% of gross sales. The Master's report found that plaintiff-franchisees collectively
owed defendant-franchisor $47,841.10 in accrued royalties. Significantly, both courts of appeals conceded that a franchisor may measure its franchise fee by a percentage of the franchisee's receipts. See 536 F.2d at 50, 448 F.2d at 50. See also Areeda, supra note 131, at 11371138 n. 51.
136. Presumably defendant-franchisor would have encountered the same hostility from
the court had it filed a counterclaim for the royalties owed. Compare 536 F.2d at 50 ("[Tlhe
trademark was the linchpin of the whole arrangement"), with id. at 54 ("The lease, as well
as the accounts receivable allowed as offsets, were sufficiently collateral to the tying arrangement to be enforceable"). See also Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Bruce's Juices, Inc.
v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
In a variation of this theme, the court refused to help plaintiffs pyramid their,damages and
upheld the trial judge's cancellation of the unlawfully tied leasehold. See 536 F.2d at 54-55.
Cf. Pogue v. International Inds., Inc., 524 F.2d 342, 345-346 (6th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff's damages should not include the anticipated profits from full performance of a partially illegal
contract). See generally Comment, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions,
27 U. CHI. L. REv. 758 (1960).

19771

ANTITRUST

We see no reason for differentiating between the treatment afforded
patents and trademarks.'37
Nonetheless, two pages earlier in the opinion he had recognized: "Unlike
a patent or a copyright which is designed to protect the uniqueness of the
product or process itself, a trademark protects only the name or symbol of
the product. This is a basic conceptual difference." 38
Having gone this far, the court went on to say:
It is suggested that if the agreement to pay a 1%royalty on all sales was
illegal the trademark owners are entitled to collect the reasonable value
of the use of the trademark. Since equity aids only those who come into
court with clean hands, we do not consider ourselves free to adopt this
suggestion. 3
Whatever decrease in the risk of antitrust liability was accorded to
trademark licensors by the Carpa and Response of Carolina decisions
might have been neutralized by an increase in the potential treble-damage
exposure upon a finding of a violation. On the other hand, such a judgment
may yet be premature.4 0
V.

CONCLUSION

It was not that long ago that an antitrust case would have been regarded
almost as a curiosity in the Fifth Circuit. The last several years, however,
have witnessed a rising awareness, by government agencies and private
litigants alike, of the opportunities for enforcing the antitrust laws in this
jurisdiction.'' As a consequence, the court of appeals has assumed a major
role in the development of antitrust jurisprudence. 4 ' Overall, its efforts in
this area during 1976 appear to be consistent with this responsibility.
137. 536 F.2d at 50 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 50.
140. See Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1376 n. 29 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (dictum) (jury's damage
verdict suspect because no evidence of a "reasonable" royalty amount had been introduced).
This survey would not be complete without reporting that in Carpa the court also had
occasion to address the issues of recoverable costs, 536 F.2d at 56 (incurred on appeal), and
reasonable attorney fees, id. at 52 (enforced an agreement assigning all awarded fees directly
to counsel), and id. at 56 (set the allowance authorized for services performed in connection
with appeal). The court also considered the effect of a release by plaintiff of one co-conspirator
on the joint and several liability of another, see id. at 55 (intention of the parties to the release
controls just what damages are covered, citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971)).
141. See, e.g., Address by Donald A. Kinkaid, Director of the Antitrust Division's Office
in Atlanta, Georgia, Antitrust Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia Seminar, Mar. 26,
1976.
142. See Reasoner & Carter, supra note 7, at 801.
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While this year's opinions broke little new ground, in only a few instances
did they fail to follow the contours of the land. Nevertheless, even the nonfarmer knows better than to speculate on the probable harvest.

